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Abstract 
The Directive 2014/104/EU also called the Damage Directive 2014 is the first legally binding 
legislation harmonizing the rules of damage action brought against an undertaking that has 
infringed EU competition law. Considering the underdevelopment of private enforcement of 
EU competition law, the objective of the Directive is to improve the situation by ensuring 
legal certainty and equality for the claimants across the Union. At the centre of the paper is 
Article 6(6) of the Damage Directive 2014 that denies national courts the right to order 
competition authorities to disclose leniency statements – an immunity from a public fine to 
the first cartel participant who voluntarily gives competition authority the evidence on the 
existence of a cartel and other participants. 
The previous practice established by the CJEU was to leave it up to the national courts to 
decide whether the access to leniency statements is necessary. The injured party has the right 
to receive a full compensation for the loss suffered due to an anti-competitive behaviour. But 
the claimant also faces the problem of information asymmetry and lack evidence to prove 
their case. Leniency statements contain useful information to the claimant and can help 
resolve this issue. However, the case-by-case approach to disclosability of leniency statements 
creates uncertainty for the leniency applicant of what will be the exact result after the self-
incriminating statement is given. Thus, the attractiveness of leniency is undermined. 
The author goes in depth of why the leniency programme is an effective and necessary tool 
for fighting cartels. Non-cooperative game theory presents the instability of the cartels and 
shows how the leniency programme can take advantage of that. Considering the secrecy and 
the difficulty to detect cartels, public authorities depend on the cooperation with a ‘whistle-
blower’. Because of this reason, the Damage Directive 2014 denied the claimant the 
possibility to use the evidence from a leniency statement in order to prove damages suffered. 
The author in this paper answers the question: can the access to leniency statements be denied 
without undermining the right to full compensation under private enforcement of EU 
competition law? In order words, is the injured party able to prove damages suffered from EU 
competition law violation without the ability to access leniency statements obtained by the 
Commission or NCA? 
In order to find an answer to the research question, the author conducts a doctrinal research on 
the functioning of a leniency programme and the current position of the claimant in a damage 
case. Research is further expanded by conducting an interview with an NCA to gain a better 
understanding on the amount and the content of evidence available to the claimant under the 
Damage Directive 2014. 
The results show that, first, for a leniency programme to be successful, it must be kept 
confidential. Considering that the leniency applicants do not receive immunity from civil 
lawsuits, the uncertainty of who will be able to access the evidence voluntarily given by the 
‘whistle-blower’ distorts the attractiveness of the programme. As a consequence, less cartel 
cases are detected. Second, lack of evidence, legal uncertainty and diversity across MS deems 
it necessary to harmonize the rules regulating damage actions in EU competition law. In the 
pass the position of the claimant in a damage action has been unfavourable and lead to 
underdevelopment of private enforcement. Third, author weights the interest of public and 
private enforcement of EU competition law in a proportionality test and concludes that the 
restriction of claimants right to access public materials is proportional and reasonable. 
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Additionally, pre-existing materials and the current privileged position of the claimant in 
private enforcement of EU competition law leads to a conclusion that claimant is able to 
prove the damages suffered. In fact, the lengthy civil procedure and other procedural issues 
are what discourage injured parties to claim the damages suffered. ADR and compliance 
programmes present a temporary solution for the parties involved. 
Author comes to a conclusion that access to leniency statements can be denied without 
undermining the right to full compensation under private enforcement of EU competition law. 
The current situation, although prohibits claimants the access to leniency statements, still for 
the first time establish a clear and predictable distinction of the evidence that is accessible. 
Pre-existing materials contain relevant information for the claimant and can be accessed at all 
times in a damage claim. Thus, the current position of the claimant in terms of evidence 
disclosure can be considered favourable. 
The final conclusion made by the author is that the Damage Directive 2014 establishes a base 
for the private enforcement of EU competition law to further build upon. Because the parties 
in damage claims still face several legal problems, the EU and MS must continue to develop 
the system of EU competition law private enforcement. That does not mean that public 
enforcement should be undermined or ADR and corporate compliance programmes no longer 
encouraged as they do provided some advantages for the injured parties, undertakings and the 
EU. However, the coexistence of public and private enforcement of competition law imposes 
a responsibility on the Commission and MS to seek out a balance between the two. 
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1. Introduction 
Business behaviour aimed to distort the competition and all the benefits it brings is without 
doubt unethical. Therefore, laws regulating business conduct and penalizing those who breach 
such laws are arguably necessary. The competition promotes innovation and ensures lower 
prices, better quality and greater variety of products.
1
 The treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, as one of the founding European Union (EU) 
treaties, recognized such a need and included first provisions aimed to prohibit anti-
competitive behaviour.
2
 Currently competition law provisions are contained in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Articles 101 and 102. Nowadays, EU 
competition law is directly applicable to the member states (MS) and applies to any company 
or individual doing business in the EU even if the company is registered in a non-EU 
country.
3
 For infringement of EU competition law companies are facing serious fines.
4
  
However, having an effective enforcement of competition law is just as important as the 
competition rules. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
has expressed that “ensuring effective compliance with rules and regulations is an important 
factor in creating a well-functioning society and trust in government.”5 In the modern 
economy cartels and other agreements limiting competition are found to be occurring 
regularly.
6
 Yet detecting such business conduct is not easy.
7
 Historically, public enforcement 
has been the main focus of the European Commission (EC).
8
 Especially, the establishment of 
an effective leniency programmes for detecting cartels.
9
 
However, one must understand the necessity of private enforcement as it is the right of an 
injured party to claim damages suffered.
10
 Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) in 
cases like Courage
11
 and Manfredi
12
 highlighted the importance of having an effective private 
enforcement of EU competition law. Directive 2014/104/EU, also known as Damage 
Directive, is the first directive governing private enforcement of EU competition law to come 
                                                 
1
 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 6
th
 edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), p. 2. 
2
 Article 67, Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 18 April 1951), available on: 
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/11a21305-941e-49d7-a171-
ed5be548cd58/publishable_en.pdf, accessed May 13, 2018. 
3
 Supra note 1, p. 97. 
4
 Berinde Mihai, "Cartels – Between Theory, Leniency Policy and Fines," Annals of Faculty of Economics, 
University of Oradea vol. 1(1) (2008): p. 550, accessed May 13, 2018, URL: 
https://ideas.repec.org/a/ora/journl/v1y2008i1p549-552.html 
5
 OECD, “Public Consultation on Best Practice Principles for Improving Regulatory Enforcement and 
Inspections,” Draft Report Submitted to the Public for Comments, 2013: p. 3, available on: 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:JIEB7RDoK0IJ:www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-
policy/Best%2520practice%2520for%2520improving%2520Inspections%2520and%2520enforcement.docx+&c
d=1&hl=lv&ct=clnk&gl=lv, accessed May 13, 2018. 
6
 Peter Z. Grossman, How Cartels Endure and how They Fail: Studies of Industrial Collusion (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004), p. 1. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law 8th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 
312. 
9
 Ibid, p. 306 
10
 C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, Court of Justice of the European Union,  20 September 2001, para 
26 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 C-295-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni, Court of Justice of the 
European Union, 13 July 2006 
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into force.
13
 In the past claimants in civil cases faced legal obstacles and contradictions 
between public and private enforcement mechanisms. More specifically, claimants often 
failed to bring a civil claim against undertakings for EU competition law infringements due to 
a lack of evidence.
14
 A solution often proposed to the problem of information asymmetry is to 
allow claimants the access to self-incriminating leniency statement.
15
 However, in order to 
keep leniency attractive, Directive 2014/104/EU prohibits claimants in civil cases the 
possibility to access it.
16
 
Realizing the importance of leniency programmes for detecting cartels in public enforcement 
and the problem with lack of evidence for the claimants in private enforcement, the following 
research question can be proposed: Can the access to leniency statements be denied 
without undermining the right to full compensation under private enforcement of EU 
competition law? 
Author researches the simultaneous necessity for an effective leniency programme and private 
enforcement. Therefore, a separate research will be conducted for both public and private 
enforcement. Special attention will be brought to leniency programmes under the public 
enforcement. Author aims to discover the role of leniency programmes in detecting cartels 
and the necessity of keeping them confidential. Moreover, the lack of evidence for claimants 
under the private enforcement is examined in detail. Research focuses on understanding the 
underdevelopment of private enforcement and the claimant’s position in proving damages 
suffered before the Directive came into force. Finally, to answer the research question, the 
provisions under the Damage Directive 2014 will be evaluated by weighing the interests of 
both enforcement systems. Author aims to discover how realistic is it for the claimant to 
prove the case and receive full compensation with pre-existing materials. Additionally, 
alternative method will be proposed as temporary solutions for the problems faced by the 
litigators. 
The aim of the research is to understand the main problem with each enforcement system, i.e. 
problem with detecting cartels and information asymmetry for claimants in damage cases. 
Author conducts a doctrinal research on these issues but, to gain a better understanding of the 
practical issues, author interviews two representatives from a national competition authority 
(NCA) and gathers the main findings in the paper. 
The work will be structured in three parts. Each part will address different issues and include 
the necessary subchapters. The first part will examine public enforcement and explain the 
nature of cartels and the advantages of a leniency programme. The second part will address 
private enforcement, its underdevelopment in EU and information asymmetry. The third part 
addresses the relationship between the two enforcement levels and the problem identified in 
the research question as well as gathers the main finding from an interview with an NCA. 
                                                 
13
 Supra note 1, p. 1044. 
14
 Einer Elhauge, Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics 2
nd
 edition (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011), chapter 1 introduction, section B, subsection 2, ii, (3). 
15
 Caterins Migani, “Directive 2014/104/EU: In Search of a Balance between the Protection of Leniency 
Corporate Statements and an Effective Private Competition Law Enforcement,” Global Antitrust Review (2014): 
p. 97, accessed May 13, 2018, URL: http://www.icc.qmul.ac.uk/gar/2014/ 
16
 Article 6(6), Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 
1-19, available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.349.01.0001.01.ENG, accessed May 13, 2018. 
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Research will end with a conclusion that includes a summary of the main findings throughout 
all parts and an answer to the research questions. 
 
  
9 
 
2. Leniency for Effective Public Enforcement of EU Competition Law 
A. Introduction 
In this section an overview of public enforcement, cartels and leniency is given. First, 
subchapter gives an analysis of the objectives of EU competition law for adopting and 
enforcing competition law. Second, a closer look on public enforcement procedure is given by 
discussing different stages and methods in detail. Third, author examines the nature and 
characteristics of cartels in detail. Fourth, the instability of cartels is explained through non-
cooperative game theory. Fifth, a section looks at the leniency programme as a tool for 
detecting cartels. The meaning of this part within the context of the whole paper is to gain an 
understanding of how public enforcement works in practice and to highlight the importance of 
cooperation with undertakings for better public enforcement. 
B. Objectives 
Before examining how competition law is enforced by the public authorities, it is important to 
first understand what the Union wants to achieve or maintain through competition rules. 
Without doubt, EU competition law has evolved over time, but the fundamental objectives 
remain. Three goals of EU competition law will be discussed in this subchapter: internal 
market, economic efficiency and consumer welfare. 
The EU is an economic and monetary union, meaning MS share an internal market and enjoy 
the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital.
17
 The objective to have an internal 
market is one of the main reasons why the EU was created
18
 and it can be argued that the 
competition rules were developed to help the EU reach this objective. Competition law was a 
necessary part of creating and maintaining a single market and the four freedoms. Angela 
Ortega Gonzales in her PhD conducts a detailed analysis on the enforcement of EU 
competition law and makes a large contribution to this legal field. She reasons that “in the 
earlier phases of integration, when the menace that private agreements could fragment the 
market into national and regional markets was still strongly present, the competition 
provisions were key to support the Treaties’ goals and, more precisely, to promote European 
integration”.19 In other words, during the beginning stages of market integration in the EU, 
goal of the competition law was to ensure the successes of it. 
However, the EU is no longer at the beginning stages of its development. Even though 
competition law is still necessary to maintain a fully functioning internal market, the system 
and its goals are not static and “[d]uring the 1990’s the goals of competition law began to 
change in line with more modern economic considerations.”20 During the modernization 
                                                 
17
 Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, European Union Politics 5th edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), p. 297. 
18
 Article 3, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version 2012), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, available on: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT, accessed May 13, 2018. 
19
 Angela Ortega Gonzales, “The Enforcement of EU Competition Law in Cartel Cases: Seeking Effectives in 
Divergence,” Dissertation submitted with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Laws of the University of 
Antwerp, 2017, p. 77, available on: 
https://repository.uantwerpen.be/desktop/irua/core/index.phtml?language=E&euser=&session=&service=opaciru
a&robot=&deskservice=desktop&desktop=irua&workstation=&extra=loi=c:irua:143909, accessed May 13, 
2018. 
20
 Ibid, p. 80. 
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process the European Commission emphasised the new focus of competition law – efficiency 
and consumer welfare. 
The objective of having fair competition is “to deliver economic efficiency, lower prices, a 
wider range of products and innovation.”21 Competition in a market place creates an 
environment where companies, in order to increase profits, are forced to look for ways to win 
over the costumer. Often that can be done by selling for less or offering better quality 
products than the competitors.
22
 In other words, less competition means less effort and more 
profit for the undertaking. Considering the negative aspect of limited competition and 
monopolies, one of the main goals for establishing and enforcing competition law is to ensure 
that the economy and society is not deprived of the benefits that competition brings. 
Additionally, CJEU added to the changing role of competition law and “identified the ‘well-
being’ or ‘welfare’ of consumers as the objective of competition law”23 in judgements 
Österreichische Postsparkasse24 and GlaxoSmithKline25. However, CJEU also clarified that 
“competition law should not be exclusively guided by the consumer welfare objective.”26 
Instead of seeing efficiency of competition and welfare of consumers as two separate 
objective of competition law, it is more accurate to view them as one. Article 101 TFEU 
perfectly demonstrates the necessity of both by prohibiting anti-competitive agreements and 
yet allowing some distortion of competition “while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit.”27 
To sum up, goals and approaches of EU competition law are not static. They change 
according to the present political, economic and social environment in the Union. Evolution 
of EU Treaties has shaped the Union and the competition law within it. The original duty of 
EU competition law was to help with a further European integration through internal market 
and the four freedoms. The modern outlook of competition law enforcement is that it must be 
aimed at achieving the efficiency that competition gives while at the same time protecting 
consumer welfare. It is important to be clear on the objective of a law as it shapes the content 
of that law and the method of enforcement. 
C. Stages of Public Enforcement 
Like discussed, establishing a competition system in the EU was an important step towards 
the internal market, economic efficiency and consumer welfare but ineffective if not 
successfully enforced. How the law is enforced is just as important as the law itself.
28
 
Therefore, this subchapter will look at possible enforcement approaches used by the public 
authorities, enforcement methods and procedure as well as the public enforcement objectives. 
                                                 
21
 Ibid, p. 12. 
22
 Achilles C. Costales, Amelia L. Bello, Ma. Angeles O. Catelo, Agham C. Cuevas, Gregmar I. Galinato and U-
Primo E. Rodriguez, Economics: Principles and Applications (Philippines: JMC Press, 2000), p. 117. 
23
 Supra note 19, p. 81 – 82. 
24
 Cases T-213/01 and T-214/01, Österreichische Postsparkasse AG v. Commission and Bank für Arbeit und 
Wirtschaft AG v. Commission, 7 June 2006, European Court of Justice 
25
 Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKlineServices Unlimited v. Commission, 27 September 2006, European Court of 
Justice 
26
 Supra note 19, p. 83. 
27
 Article 101(3), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version 2012), OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, available on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN, accessed May 13, 2018. 
28
 Champe S. Andrews, “The Importance of the Enforcement of Law,” The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science Vol. 34 No. 1 (1909): p. 85, accessed May 13, 2018, URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1011347 
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In competition law public authorities have investigative powers and the right to make a 
decision based on evidence collected and this decision can be reviewed at CJEU.
29
 Regulation 
1/2003/EC, containing procedural rules, brought several changes to the public enforcement 
system of the competition law in the EU. One of the most significant changes was that EU 
competition law became directly applicable by the national courts and the national 
competition authorities.
30
 Thus, after the modernization of competition law in the EU, public 
enforcement became decentralized and enforceable by two authorities – EC regionally and 
NCAs nationally. However, “[c]ompetition procedure is still very centralised, although 
substantial work has been outsourced to NCA’s and courts.”31 The Commission has power to 
prohibit business conduct in a MS and act as a detective and a judge.
32
 But regardless of who 
enforces the law, the structure of an enforcement procedure is the same. Work of competition 
law authorities can be divided into two parts - detection part and intervention part.
33
 
During the part of detection, public authority must determine whether the suspicious business 
conduct is an actual breach of competition law or simply a “procompetitive business 
conduct”.34 In some cases, a specific business conduct is prohibited by law, for example, 
horizontal price fixing, but in some cases “the procompetitive effects of certain behaviour 
have to be weighed against the anticompetitive effects”35, meaning every case is different and 
must be evaluated by the competition authorises or later by the CJEU. Competition authorities 
must also determine when to initiate the detection process - before or after the illegal conduct 
has occurred.
36
 In other words, competition authorities can detect anti-competitive business 
conduct not only after it has happened but also before it has actually taken place. 
However, just finding an infringement or possible infringement is not enough to successfully 
enforce the competition law. Therefore, the second part – intervention part – is needed. In 
Centre for Competition Policy’s (CCP) Working Paper 13-5 on different approaches on 
enforcement it is said that “[f]rom the viewpoint of an antitrust authority, the intervention 
stage adds a third powerful decision variable to the already identified choices of the control 
strategy and the timing of control: the type of intervention.”37 In other words, depending on 
the method used during the detection part and in what time set it is used (before or after the 
infringement occurred), the intervention part will differ accordingly. Type of intervention 
most often used is a monetary fine because of the deterrent effect.
38
 But in cases when the 
infringement has not yet taken place and, thus, no harm has occurred, imposing a fine is 
arguably unjustifiable. Thus, in such cases competition authorities can reach for other 
measures – behavioural and structural remedies.39  
                                                 
29
 Supra note 8, p. 309. 
30
 Piet Jan Slot and Martin Farley, An Introduction to Competition Law 2nd Edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2017), p. 221. 
31
 Valentine Korah, An introduction Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice 9th Edition (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007), p. 282. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Kai Hüschelrath and Sebastian Peyer, “Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law a Differentiated 
Approach,” CCP Working Paper 13-5 (2013): p. 3, accessed May 13, 2018, URL: 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8235394/CCP+Working+Paper+13-5.pdf/86d76261-eda5-
4de7-af2a-51d9684e0c45 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid, p. 4. 
38
 Supra note 8, p. 452. 
39
 Supra note 33, p. 4. 
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To sum up, public enforcement of competition law is complex and crucial for EU objectives 
to be carried out. Currently public enforcement can be divided into national and regional 
sections as EU competition law is directly applicable in the Member States. The authorities 
are expected to detect breaches of competition law out of procompetitive business conducts 
and intervene by imposing, in most cases, a fine that must be calculated in a way that 
diminishes the desire to breach the law. Public enforcement no doubt has an effect on the 
overall competition law system, but “it remains difficult to establish casual links between 
different approaches to enforcement and the overall quality of the regulatory system.”40 In 
other words, there is not one correct enforcement approach to successful competition system. 
Additionally, “the pattern and style of enforcement is unlikely to remain stable over time 
since it is likely to adapt to changes in the entire regulatory system.”41 Therefore, the EU must 
constantly look for ways to improve competition law enforcement and fight serious violations 
of EU competition law. Arguably, the most serious type of anti-competitive business conduct 
is the formation of cartels and, at the same time, one of the most difficult to detect.
42
 The 
following subchapter examines cartels in more detail. 
D. A Closer Look at Cartels 
Cartels are considered to be the most serious competition law offence “as the operators 
specifically attempt to eliminate or limit the free play of competition.”43 Cartels bring no 
benefit to the economy or society
44
 and are prohibited by Article 101 of TFEU. Thus, it is not 
surprising that cartels are very secretive and it is difficult for competition authorities to detect 
them.
45
 In this subchapter author discusses cartel definition and the effect on the economy. 
A cartel can be defined as an explicit collusion by undertakings to take advantage of their 
joint market power and increase profits by fixing prices, restricting output, sharing markets or 
rigging bids.
46
 In a tacit collision undertakings are operating in an oligopolistic market and set 
prices as if they were in an explicit collision.
47
 Anti-competitive agreements that directly 
distort competition are also called ‘hard core’ cartels and are automatically void.48 It must be 
noted that not all agreements limiting competition are considered ‘hard core’. If the limitation 
to the competition contributes to “improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit”49 it would not be considered a violation of EU competition law. However, 
there is a “widespread consensus” that companies are meant to compete with each other and 
anti-competitive agreements, especially ‘hard core’ cartels should be illegal.50 
                                                 
40
 Iain MacNeil, “Enforcement and Sanctioning,” in The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation, ed. Niamh 
Moloney et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 12. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Irena Pekarskiene and Jurgita Bruneckiene, “The Relationship between Cartels and Economic Fluctuations,” 
Inžinerinė Ekonomika - Engineering Economics Vol 26 No 3 (2015): p. 284, accessed May 13, 2018, DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.ee.26.3.7331 
43
 Supra note 8, p. 651. 
44
 Supra note 4, p. 549.  
45
 OECD, “Fighting Hard Core Cartels: harm, effective sanctions and leniency programmes,” OECD Publishing, 
2002, p. 67, available on: www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/fightinghard-
corecartelsharmeffectivesanctionsandleniencyprogrammes.htm, accessed May 13, 2018. 
46
 Supra note 1, p. 650. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Supra note 27, Article 101(2). 
49
 Supra note 27, Article 101(3). 
50
 Supra note 8, p. 546. 
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The objective of undertakings when forming a cartel is to maximize its profits and eliminate 
competition.
51
 By forming cartels, undertakings gain market power which allows them to 
raise prices above the competitive level.
52
 Cartel members act only for selfish reasons 
“undermining the welfare of both the consumers and other market participants, and in the end, 
it has a negative effect on the overall economy.”53 On average in Europe duration of cartels is 
around 6 – 7 years with an overcharge around 20%.54 Considering the illegality and negative 
effects on competition caused by the cartels, undertakings keep such agreements very 
secretive and, with the help of modern technology, it becomes easier to hide communication 
and the content exchanged.
55
 Consequently, it becomes more difficult of the competition 
authorities to detect cartels. Although there are several proactive detection methods that can 
be used by the competition authorities
56
, still the best and most effective tool used to fight 
cartel is leniency as it exploits the instability of cartels.
57
  
To sum up, cartels are the biggest threat to fair competition and they are widely considered 
illegal. However, undertakings still choose to form such collisions for profit maximizing 
reasons and make sure that such agreements stay secrets. In order to fight cartel public 
authorities take an advantage of cartel instability which is discussed further. 
E. Cartel Instability 
Even though cartels can increase the profits of the undertakings involved if not discovered, 
such agreements are still doomed to end. For a cartel agreement to be maintained successfully 
undertakings involved “must be able to select an appropriate equilibrium and agree on 
complex collusive and mutually consistent strategies which allow the parties to jointly 
increase benefits and find an acceptable system to reallocate such benefits.”58 However, 
cartels suffer the problem of instability as there will be a natural tendency to deviate from the 
agreement.
59
 
Instability of cartels can be explained through game theory, especially non-cooperative 
games.
60
 Non-cooperative game mathematically demonstrates “strategic interaction” between 
the players.
61
 The game includes information on “the players in the game […], the 
information they have […], actions they can choose, the timing of these actions, and the pay-
offs for each player that result from those actions.”62 It is assumed that each player will 
choose the pay-off most favourable to them.
63
 The specific of non-cooperative game is that 
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the players cannot make binding agreements just like cartel participants in real life as cartel 
agreements are illegal and cannot be enforced in a court.
64
 
Moreover, an example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma65 will be given to demonstrate how non-
cooperative game theory works. The situation presented in Prisoner’s Dilemma involves two 
players that are the suspects for committing a murder. The police do not have enough 
evidence to prove the allegation. Therefore, the police place the players in separate rooms 
without the possibility to communicate with each other and offer them the following pay-offs. 
If one player betrays the other, the one who betrayed goes free, but the other player serves 3 
years in jail. If both players keep silent, both serve 1 year for holding a gun without a licence. 
If both players betray one another, both serve 2 years in jail.  
The outcomes can be presented as follows: 
Undertaking A 
 
                 Undertaking B 
Withhold the sugar Cheat the agreement 
Withhold the sugar 1/1 0/3 
Cheat the agreement 3/0 2/2 
  
As it can be observed, the strategy for both of the prisoners would be to betray the other 
player because it is the best outcome regardless of what the other player chooses. Thus, if 
both players choose to betray, the outcome would be that both serve 2 years in jail. Instead, if 
both players kept silent, they would only have to serve 1 year in jail, which is a better 
outcome for both. However, without knowing what the other player is going to choose, an 
undertaking bear the risk of serving 3 years in jail if the other player chooses to betray. 
Cartel participants in real life are in a similar situation. Meaning, undertakings are in a non-
binding agreement, have to choose between two options (comply or cheat the agreement) and 
will make decisions based on having a better outcome for oneself. For example, two 
companies in the sugar production business form a cartel in which they agree to withhold the 
sugar from the market to raise the price of it.
66
 According to microeconomic theory of supply, 
demand and market equilibrium, a decrease in supply results in an increase in price.
67
 With 
the joint market power, undertakings can increase the price of the sugar by withholding the 
supply. However, by deviating from the agreements and dumping the sugar, it is more certain 
that an undertaking will make a profit. 
In a cartel agreement complying with the agreement is equal to keeping silent in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and cheating the agreement is equal to betrayal. So, if undertakings 
comply with the agreement and withhold the supply of sugar, both earn 10 million euros. If 
one complies, but the other dumps the sugar into the market, the one who complied earns 3 
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million euros but the cheating undertaking ears 15 million euros. If both cheat the agreement, 
both ear 7 million.  
The outcomes can be presented as follows: 
Undertaking A 
 
                 Undertaking B 
Withhold the sugar Cheat the agreement 
Withhold the sugar 10/10 15/3 
Cheat the agreement 3/15 7/7 
 
The reason why undertakings choose to form a cartel in the first place is to increase profits for 
oneself.
68
 The firms in a sugar production business can raise the price of sugar and everyone’s 
profit only if all cartel members stick to the agreement. But because of the self interest in 
maximizing the profits, undertakings are likely to cheat. By dumping the sugar undertaking 
will increase its sales and profit. Simultaneously the price of the sugar will drop. The 
undertaking complying with the agreement is selling less sugar at a lower price. Therefore, 
without the possibility to know whether or not other cartel member will comply, the strategy 
of an undertaking will be to cheat the agreement. 
In reality cartels operate in a more dynamic setting and the stability of cartels depend on more 
factors.
69
 For example, in an oligopolistic market, undertakings have a possibility to meet 
more often, to ‘play the game’ more than once and to make compliance a dominant strategy.70 
Additionally, to ensure stability of cartels “participants classically develop mechanisms to 
make cheating unappealing, including monitoring compliance, rewards and credible 
punishments for deviating firms.”71 
In conclusion, even though stability of a cartel in real life depends on many factors, non-
cooperative game theory accurately presents the process for decision making of undertaking 
when deciding to comply or deviate from the agreement. The basic problem that all cartels 
face some level of instability gives competition authorities an opportunity to take advantage 
of it by introducing leniency as a variable during the decision process. 
F. Leniency Programme 
Public authorities offer full or partial immunity from fines in return for information and 
evidence of a cartel to the first leniency programme applicant.
72
 This subchapter is dedicated 
to defining and explaining the leniency programme and its success in detecting cartels. 
Leniency programme under EU competition law is a system offered by the public authorities 
to ‘fight’ harmful and secretive cartels. Leniency programme is designed to encourage 
undertakings involved in a cartel to be the first to step forward in return for obtaining partial 
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or total immunity from penalties.
73
 The Commission and NCAs use leniency programmes as a 
tool for discovering cartels because “the uncovering issue can only be solved by offering 
cartel members incentives that are attractive enough for them to come forward and provide 
competition authorities information about the existence of the cartel.”74 Considering the 
amount of cartels that have been detected, leniency programmes have proven to be a very 
successful investigative tool.
75
 
At the interview with the Latvian NCA (see Annex I) author discovers that in 2013 – 2017 
Latvian NCA in total had 12 successful leniency applications.
76
 Even though the Latvian 
market is small, the number of leniency applications has been increasing since the NCA 
started offering the programme. According to the opinion of the Latvian NCA, there is no 
better way to fight cartels than the leniency programme or, at least, nothing better has been 
proposed.
77
   
The result of a leniency programme causing cartels to become unstable again and making it 
difficult to sustain them is also called the desistance effect.
78
 Undertakings face the risk of not 
only other cartel participants cheating the agreement but also the risk that they will ‘blow the 
whistle’. If cartel members are facing the risk of earning less profit of paying a large amount 
of fines to competition authority, it is likely that the cartel will not be sustained for long as all 
the members will act with self-interests in mind rather than the collective ones. 
Moreover, the leniency programme adds to cartel formation another level of risk of being 
caught. That can lead to an outcome that the cartel is “less likely to form in the first place.”79 
Meaning, a cartel might not even form if the risk of other cartel participants cheating the 
agreement or ‘blowing the whistle’ is higher than the benefits gained through the cartels. This 
is known as the deterrent effect.
80
 Considering the previously discussed difficulty in detecting 
cartels, such effects caused by the leniency programme are welcomed by the public 
enforcement authorities. 
Moreover, the reason why cartel members decide to apply for a leniency can be explained by 
once again modelling a non-cooperative game situation. Structure again resembles the 
scenario of Prisoner’s Dilemma where cartel members have a non-binding agreement, have to 
choose between two options (to comply with the agreement or to apply for leniency) and the 
strategy again is to increase the pay-off for oneself. For example, members of the cartel 
agreement are now faced with competition authorities offering full immunity from a fine to 
the first cartel member to admit the existence of the cartel and provide the necessary evidence 
for the competition authority. The undertaking who complies with the cartel agreement gets 
fined for 80 million euros. If both undertakings comply with the cartel agreement and the 
Commission or an NCA discovers the illegal agreement, both cartel members will be charged 
100 million. If both cartel members admit to the wrongdoing to the competition authority that 
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has already initiated the investigation (applies for a settlement)
81
, both cartel members get a 
reduced fine and are charged with 30 million euros. 
The outcomes can be presented as follows: 
Undertaking A 
 
                 Undertaking B 
Withhold the sugar Cheat the agreement 
Withhold the sugar 100/100 0/80 
Cheat the agreement 80/0 30/30 
 
It can be observed that the strategy of undertakings will be to apply for the leniency as it 
offers the best pay-offs. An undertaking will be either freed or fined 30 million euros 
depending on the actions of others. Although cartels can maximize the profits if all 
undertakings comply, it can also result in being fined 80 or 100 million euros if others decide 
to apply for leniency programme. The cartel member with self-interests in mind will opt for 
applying for the leniency as it result in the best pay-off regardless of what the other 
undertaking does. 
For the reason presented above leniency is an effective way to force a cartel to end. 
Additionally, timing is of an importance in this situation because only the first undertaking 
receives full immunity from fines. Thus, without the possibility to know what other cartel 
members are planning on doing, the leniency programme places all cartel participants in an 
uncomfortable position where the best option is to apply for leniency but only the first one to 
do it will receive the benefit. Leniency programme successfully destabilises the existence of 
cartels by imposing a time constrain on the possibility to gain the benefits of the leniency 
programme. The OECD has spoken out on the leniency programmes introducing a reduced 
fine for subsequent applicant as competition authorities would be able to obtain new evidence 
and many jurisdictions in the EU do offer it.
82
 But the main idea for a leniency programme to 
be effective in fighting cartel is that it must offer full immunity only to the first applicant. 
In conclusion, leniency programmes so far have been the best tool available to the public 
authorities for catching cartels and ensuring successful enforcement of EU competition law. 
Thus, public enforcement is largely dependent on cooperation. Due to harmful and secretive 
nature of the cartel, it is important for the EU to continue developing and perfecting the 
current leniency programme and to look for more ways to take advantage of the instability of 
cartels and the tendency for undertakings to cheat. 
G. Conclusion 
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To sum up, EU’s objectives and the goals of competition law play a crucial role in 
establishing the enforcement method and procedure. Since the modernization of competition 
system, efficiency and consumer welfare have become the core objectives of the system. 
However, the EU’s goal of an integrated Europe and internal market is still present. When it 
comes to the methods of competition law enforcement, it becomes clear that public 
enforcement consists of many different stages that all depend on one another. EC and the 
NCAs enforcement procedure must have at least two parts – detection and intervention. 
Finally, a special attention is brought to cartels as they are considered to be the most 
destructive form of anti-competitive business conduct. After analysing the behaviour and 
decision making process of cartel members, it becomes clear that leniency is an effective way 
to take an advantage of unavoidable cartel instability. 
A conclusion can be made that EU competition law public enforcement aims to solve 
problems with several interests involves. Finding the right ‘recipe’ that would ensure 
competition is a challenge as competition authorities have to continually balance between 
protecting competition and letting business run its course in a free market economy. Thus, it 
is unavoidable that contradictions and debates will arise about where the EU competition law 
enforcement is going and what it is trying to achieve. However, as long as public authorities 
are clear on the objectives the proper enforcement can be found. Even if the objectives 
change, the variety of different public enforcement methods and tools available to the EC and 
NCAs are a great advantage in supporting this evolution. 
Currently the emphasis of public enforcement is put on cartels and developing leniency 
programme that would help detect and decrease cartel cases. Public authorities must take into 
account every detail that could make a leniency programme unappealing to apply for. If the 
Commission wants the number of detected cartel cases to continue growing, it cannot afford 
to make any compromises when it comes to provisions related to the leniency programme. 
Moreover, leniency programmes and cartels do not operate in a ‘vacuum’. Other legislative 
acts and decisions made by the EC and NCAs, especially private enforcement of EU 
competition law, will have an effect on how cartel members choose their strategy. 
Public enforcement requires a well-established private enforcement as it not only protects the 
rights of individuals but also compliments the public enforcement.
83
 Thus, the author 
continues with a discussion on private enforcement of EU competition law and researches the 
current legal problems faced by the claimants in civil suits.  
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3. Lack of Evidence for the Claimant under Private Enforcement of EU 
Competition Law 
A. Introduction 
In the following part of paper author looks deeper into the private enforcement of EU 
competition law. The Commission has been working towards a better private enforcement 
system by adopting several recommendations, practical guides and proposing for legislation.
84
 
The development of private enforcement of EU competition law has been slow and often time 
difficult to measure as “many actions may be settled out of court and details are rarely public, 
as secrecy is normally a condition of settlement, so that the small number of known cases may 
represent only the tip of a much bigger base of litigation.”85 But even in such a situation, 
public enforcement in still arguably underdeveloped.
86
 Thus, the aim of this part of the paper 
is, first, to discover the goals of private enforcement of EU competition law, second, to 
discuss the necessity for developing the system, third, to consider the issues related to 
information asymmetry and, fourth, the current legislation regulating this problem – Damage 
Directive 2014. 
B. Objectives and the Relationship to Public Enforcement  
In this subchapter the author discusses whether private enforcement simply contributes to 
public goals or does private enforcement have separate goals that the national courts will 
carry out during the civil procedure. Thus, this subchapter will look in more detail at the 
relationship between the goals of two enforcement mechanisms.  
It can be agreed that private enforcement is aimed at protecting the private interests of market 
participants by ensuring the possibility to claim damages or loss suffered due to anti-
competitive practice. In the EU anyone who has suffered actual loss or loss of profit, has the 
right to be compensated accordingly.
87
 While public enforcement is enforced with the aim to 
punish the undertaking for EU competition law violation, damage actions under private 
enforcement of EU competition, on the other hand, are concerned only with compensating the 
injured party.
88
 
The principle of direct effect and the principle of supremacy is applicable to Article 101 and 
102 of TFEU.
89
 When it comes to the issue of determining the validity of a contract in cases 
of anti-competitive practice, the answer can be found directly in the Article 101 (2) TFEU that 
says: “[a]ny agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically 
void.”90 However, when it comes to damage actions and injunctions there are no direct rules 
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contained in the TFEU. Nevertheless, CJEU in its 2001 judgment of the Courage case
91
 
pointed out the fact the Article 101 would be ‘put at risk’ if individuals were deprived of the 
right to file damage claims or other private actions concerning anti-competitive practices.
92
 
This determines that private individuals in MS have the right to claim damages from other 
individuals due to their anti-competitive practice and the duty to respect competition rules in 
order for a contract to be valid.
93
 
The judgment of Courage case was the first significant step towards the development of 
damage actions in EU competition law.
94
 The doctrine set out in the judgment was later 
expanded in the case of Manfredi
95
 in 2006. The case introduced additional concepts that “set 
out conditions relating to the court competent to hear such actions, limitation periods and the 
availability of punitive damages and other aspects of damage quantification.”96 
Realization that individuals have a different interest when claiming damages due to anti-
competitive practices has led to believe that there is a clear line between the public and 
private objective of competition law enforcement. The Commission itself has been “insisting 
on distinguishing between public authorities, whose acts are guided by the public interest, and 
national courts, which decide disputes pertaining to the private interest.”97  
However, it is a misunderstanding to believe that both enforcement systems through different 
actors and authorities are trying to reach different goals. Moreover, “courts do in fact have to 
consider economic public policy in their judgments when the dispute in question has a wider 
impact on the market”98, meaning national courts while judging on private law matters still 
have to keep in mind the public objectives of economic policy, internal market objectives and 
competition law goals. Furthermore, in the EU there have been cases when a national court 
has ruled the contract invalid due to anti-competitive reason, even if none of the parties have 
raised this issue or a public authority has intervened in a civil proceeding due to public 
interest.
99
 When looking at the private enforcement system from this point of view, it appears 
that “private interest play a complementary role to the public interest.”100 
However, it is also a mistake to believe that private enforcement is carried out simply for the 
reason of public interests or goals. The EU aims at protecting competition, internal market, 
consumer welfare, efficiency and all other public goals, but private enforcement, additionally, 
aims at protecting the economic freedom of individuals. Therefore, the goal of private 
enforcement of EU competition law is simply “a reflexive subsidiary aim of protecting 
competition.”101 In other words, in order for an agreement or a practice to be banned under 
EU competition law by the public authorities it does not require that there is harm done to an 
individual. In theory, public enforcement can exist without the private enforcement. 
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Nevertheless, CJEU points out that the “actions for damages before the national courts can 
make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the 
Community.”102 
It can be concluded that private enforcement while having its own objective does not “alter 
the basic goal of the competition rules, which is to safeguard the public interest in maintaining 
free and undistorted competition”103 and it should also not be viewed as a mandatory part of 
the public enforcement. In reality, it is the opposite. Two enforcement systems operate with 
separate objectives in mind while complementing and strengthening each other. It is not 
surprising that the Commission has paid much of its attention to the development of private 
enforcement. On one hand, the EU recognizes individuals’ economic freedom and the rights 
to be compensated for damages caused by an undertaking due to anti-competitive behaviour 
while, on the other hand, recognizing the benefit of even greater level of competition and 
additional help to the public enforcement of EU competition law. 
C. Underdevelopment of Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law 
This subchapter is aimed at defining private enforcement of EU competition law. By stressing 
the benefits of private enforcement of competition law, the author will highlight the necessity 
of the system. Focus is brought to the underdevelopment of competition law private 
enforcement and the reason behind it. 
There are several elements that characterise private enforcement of EU competition law. The 
most obvious one being, the parties involved are both private persons (legal or natural) and 
disputes between them are settled by the national civil courts. In more detail, private 
enforcement of competition law can be defined as follows: “[t]he enterprises and the citizens 
who had suffered or had been victims of a breach of the antitrust prohibitions provoke the 
enforcement of competition law by the Courts by filing a civil action against the author of the 
unlawful conduct.”104 
Like once mentioned, private enforcement of competition law has three forms. More 
specifically, private enforcement of competition law includes nullity of contracts if Article 
101 TFEU is infringed, injunctive relief and damage actions.
105
 However, “damage claims are 
thought of as the most important limb of private antitrust enforcement”106 as claiming a 
compensation is the direct way for an individual to exercise his/her rights of economic 
freedom. Moreover, a private action can be either follow-on or stand-alone action.
107
 
Meaning, the action is brought either on the finding for the competition authority (follow-on) 
or initiated independently before the competition authority has concluded the public 
proceeding (stand-alone). A follow-on action is more encouraged as the claimant bases the 
case on the work of competition authority instead of running the case “in parallel with public 
enforcement proceedings.”108  
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Even though individuals are presented with a possibility to claim damages or other forms of 
private enforcement of EU competition law, the Commission after conducting a study on the 
conditions for damage claims in 2004 discovered “astonishing diversity and total 
underdevelopment” of damage action across MS.109 The survey discovered that “there were 
apparently around 60 judgments as a result of damage actions […] only 28 resulted in a 
damage reward.”110 For a long time the Commission has wanted to improve the situation with 
damage claims and to see the rates of competition law private enforcement increase in EU 
countries.
111
 
That is not surprising as a successful private enforcement system of competition law may 
bring great benefits. The beneficiary is not just the person in a position to claim compensation 
but also public enforcement system, other undertakings and the whole economy.  Following 
list indicates the main advantages that can be gained by having an effective private 
enforcement. 
First, private enforcement could lead to increase in compliance with the competition law.
112
 In 
the public enforcement of competition law the deterrent effect is the reason for imposing a 
fine for law violations.
113
 Meaning, undertakings will comply with the law because of the fear 
of having to pay the fine. Even though private enforcement of competition law only aims to 
compensate and not “overcompensate,”114 an undertaking might still choose not to infringe 
the law so that damages do not need to be paid. Second, victims would be compensated for 
the loss suffered.
115
 The right to compensation is the cornerstone of private enforcement of 
competition law and obviously and an effective system leads to greater opportunities to 
exercises this right. Third, courts can offer speedier interim relief to undertakings than public 
proceedings.
116
 Undertaking through civil courts can declare contracts null and void or request 
injunctive relief before the public authorities have ended the public proceeding. Fourth, 
without the private enforcement “[t]he costs of the unlawful conducts are borne by the 
customers and law-abiding businesses, and not by the wrongdoers.”117 For EU competition 
law violation an undertaking might pay a fine to the public authority, but, without private 
enforcement, the innocent individuals do not get a direct benefit from this fine. Fifth, lack of 
an effective private enforcement of competition law leads to less competition law violation 
being detected.
118
 If undertakings that comply with the law or consumers that have suffered a 
loss due EU competition law violation know that they have an actual chance at winning a civil 
case against the wrongdoer, it is more likely that more violation will be detected by private 
individuals. Sixth, in case of lack of private enforcement of EU competition law “greater 
prices and less innovation have to be expected.”119 Taking into account also the previously 
listed reasons, a conclusion can be made that underdeveloped private enforcement of EU 
competition law leads to less competition and, therefore, also to all the disadvantages and 
harm that comes with it. 
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The underdevelopment, “virtual non-existence”120 and slow improvements of EU competition 
law private enforcement in the past can be explained by many factors, for example, 
institutional problems and uncertainties as to the calculation of damages.
121
 However, the 
information asymmetry in particular placed the claimant in an unfavourable position when 
proving a case. The claimant often had “difficulties in proving causation and the extent of 
harm” and had to deal with “restrictive and antiquated evidence rules.”122 Thus, low rate of 
damage claims
123
 can be explained with the problem that claimants often do not have enough 
evidence to prove a case.
124
 The problem with information asymmetry will be researched in 
more detail in the following subchapter. 
To sum up, private enforcement of EU competition law can be defined as a private person 
bringing a civil claim (nullity of contracts, injunctive relief or damage action) to a national 
court for suffering a loss due to EU competition law infringement. For EU the establishment 
of a successful private enforcement system of competition law is important because it brings 
several advantages to the EU itself as well as the consumers and undertakings that follow the 
law. The problem, however, is that the current state of private enforcement of EU competition 
law is underdeveloped. One reason for that could be the lack of evidence for the claimants. 
Thus, paper continues with a deeper analysis of information asymmetry. 
D. Information Asymmetry and Legal Uncertainty  
The burden of proof in the damage claim of EU competition law is on the claimant.
125
 The 
evidence necessary “typically require[s] a complex factual and economic analysis”126 and 
includes “economic elements such as the definition of the relevant market and the market 
shares of the parties.”127 In most cases, the defendant or a third party obtains information and 
materials that are relevant for the claimant and it cannot be easily accessed.
128
 Thus, the 
complexity of the evidence requested and the difficulty to obtain it places the claimant in 
unfavourable position. The lack of evidence and information available might discourage 
individuals who have suffered a loss due to anti-competitive behaviour to not claim 
compensation. 
In order to successfully claim damages, claimants are usually requested to prove the following 
three points: 
First, in a stand-alone case the claimant will need to establish an infringement of the 
competition rules.
129
 The claimant will have to detect the infringement and gather the 
evidence to prove such a claim. The evidence in most cases will have to contain confidential 
materials from undertakings and third parties. However, in a follow-on action the claimant 
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bases the claim on the findings of a competition authority
130
 and no longer is under the 
obligation to prove the competition law infringement. 
Second, the claimant will have to quantify the competition law damages.
131
 Everyone has the 
right to be fully compensated for the harm suffered,
132
 but the claimant faces a difficulty to 
measure the quantity of that harm. Quantification can be defined as “comparing the actual 
position of claimants with the position they would find themselves in had the infringement not 
occurred.”133 The problem is that it is a “hypothetical assessment” and “complex and specific 
economic and competition law issues often arise.”134 
Third, the claimant will have to establish causality between the infringement and the harm 
suffered.
135
 Again the claimant will in most cases run into the problem of needing to access 
information obtained by the defendant or a third party. 
Therefore, accessing self-incriminating leniency statements can be very helpful for the 
claimant to gather the necessary evidence as it contains evidence on the illegal conduct 
voluntarily provided by the leniency applicant or in a settlement proceeding.
136
 
Furthermore, CJEU has also expressed that the injured party often is lacking evidence and 
eventually the Court “opened up the possibility of access to leniency corporate statements.”137 
In the case of Pfleiderer
138in 2011 the company “Pfleiderer” was refused the access to 
leniency statements by a national court of Germany. After appealing the judgment, the 
national court of Germany referred to the CJEU which ruled that it is up for the MS to 
determine and apply national rules related to accessing leniency statements by third parties.
139
 
The Court noted that national courts should “weigh the respective interests in favour of 
disclosure of the information and in favour of the protection of that information provided 
voluntarily by the applicant for leniency.”140 Meaning, CJEU established a practice where it 
was in the hand of a national judge to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to order access 
to public proceeding files including leniency. Additionally, in the preliminary ruling of 2013 
in Donau Chemie
141
 case it was established “that national law must not make it impossible for 
national courts to conduct the weighing exercise on a case-by case basis.”142 However, the 
case-by-case approach to evident disclosure “could lead to discrepancies between and even 
within Member States regarding the disclosure of evidence from the files of competition 
authorities.”143 
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This lack of evidence and the legal uncertainly faced by the claimant and the defendant 
contributed to the underdevelopment of private enforcement of EU competition law and, 
therefore, the Commission proposed to adopt Directive 2014/104/EU, also called Damage 
Directive 2014.
144
 It harmonizes the rules related to damage claims for violations of EU 
competition law, includes provision relates to obtaining evidence and denies national court the 
right to order the disclosure of leniency statements to be used in a damage case.
145
   
The main issue that needs to be recognized in this subchapter is that the discovery of low rates 
of damage claims in EU competition law can be linked to the problem of information 
asymmetry. In the past, an individual was faced with the uncertainty that if the national court 
denies access to public proceeding materials, for example, leniency, the lack of evidence 
might lead to a situation where the claimant is not able to prove the damages suffered and 
claim the compensation. Damage Directive 2014 coming into force has resolved the issue of 
the uncertainty of what kind of evidence the national court can order to be disclosed. But the 
access to leniency statements is denied. Thus, the exact content of materials available for the 
claimant needs to be examined in order to understand how favourable the claimant’s position 
under the Damage Directive 2014 is. 
E. Damage Directive 2014 in Terms of Disclosure of Evidence 
The aim of this subchapter is to examine what are the exact rights of the parties involved in a 
damage claim for violation of EU competition law in terms of disclosure of evidence. The 
subchapter discussed the development of the Damage Directive 2014 and the aims of it.  
Author gives an overview provision contained in the Damage Directive 2014 and looks in 
more detail at the provisions related to accessing self-incriminating statements and other 
public materials by third parties. 
Damage Directive was adopted in November 2014 and came into force December 27, 2016.
146
 
It is the first legally binding act within the field of EU competition law private enforcement
147
 
and was created to harmonize the system and minimize the differences between MS so that 
everyone’s right to be compensated is recognized equally.148 Damage Directive 2014 is the 
result of the Commission initiative to develop private enforcement of EU competition law.
149
 
The Commission in the Green Paper 2005
150
 and the White Paper 2008
151
 “made proposals 
and specific policy measures focused on improving legal conditions.”152 After the judgements 
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of Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie, the Commission took a stand that “‘united in diversity’ 
parole is not to be applied in case of damages actions within the EU”153 as it obviously leads 
to uncertainty. 
With the proposal to adopt Damage Directive 2014, the Commission wanted to ensure “a 
balance between the need for a public repression of cartels and the right of private citizens 
and companies to be compensated for the damages they suffered.”154 Damage Directive 2014 
is aimed at ensuring full compensation to the claimants and a complementary relationship 
between the public and private enforcement.
155
 With this directive the European Parliament 
has created “a sort of “micro-system” rules of law about civil liability that makes it easier for 
victims of antitrust violation to claim compensation.”156 
The Directive gives the right to anyone to be compensated for the harm suffered from EU 
competition law infringement as well as “similar provisions of national competition law.”157 
Thus, the scope and subject matter of the Damage Directive 2014 covers the EU’s objective 
of private enforcement to protect the economic freedom and recognize the fundamental right 
of an injured party to be compensated. The compensation includes actual loss and loss of 
profits and the payment of interest.
158
 Additionally, the Directive harmonizes rules and 
defines legal concepts related to the effect of national decisions, limitation periods, joint and 
several liabilities,
159
 the passing-on of overcharges
160
 and the quantification of harm.
161
  
For the purpose of this paper, the most important part of the Damage Directive 2014 is 
Chapter II that lays out articles related to the disclosure of evidence.
162
 According to the 
Directive MS have the duty to ensure that national court can order the disclosure of evidence 
upon the request of the claimant as long as reasoned justification is given.
163
 Article 6(5) lists 
three types of evidence that the national courts can order to be disclosed after the competition 
authority has closed public proceedings. The evidence must be “prepared by a natural or legal 
person specifically for the proceedings of a competition authority,” “information that the 
competition authority has drawn up and sent to the parties in the course of its proceedings” 
and “settlement submissions that have been withdrawn.”164 In other words, claimants have 
access to any pre-existing information or evidence “that exists irrespective of the proceedings 
of a competition authority and whether or not such information is in the file of a competition 
authority.”165 
However, the Damage Directive 2014 also sets out limitations to the provisions related to 
disclosure of evidence. Firstly, it is stated in the Directive that national court’s orders must be 
proportionate.
166
 Meaning, the court cannot order competition authorities or third parties to 
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disclose materials that are not necessary or that claimants cannot give a reason for their 
necessity. Secondly, it is prohibited for a national court to order at any time disclosure of 
evidence contained in leniency statements or settlement submissions.
167
 Thus, under the 
current legislation claimant is not able to gather the necessary evidence by accessing a self-
incriminating leniency statement. Considering that materials obtained from leniency 
statements improve the position of the claimant greatly, such a provision constitutes a 
limitation of the right to be compensated and to have a fair trial. 
In conclusion, Damage Directive 2014 was a necessary step that needed to be taken so private 
enforcement of EU competition law could develop. Harmonization and legal certainty across 
all MS possibility brings a sense of relief that claimants no longer have to forum shop for a 
jurisdiction that is most favourable at that moment. However, denied access to leniency 
statements might again place the claimant that situation where information asymmetry 
decrease the chance of proving a case.   
F. Conclusion 
To summarize, the main findings for this part of the paper includes the realisation that public 
and private enforcement, although aim to reach different objective, still are interconnected. A 
civil law case can be based of the decision of a public proceeding, thus an effective public 
enforcement system of EU competition law is favoured by individuals and law-abiding 
undertakings. Moreover, an effective private enforcement system of EU competition law leads 
to several benefits that all result in an overall greater level of competition. The reality, 
however, is that in the EU private enforcement of competition law is underdeveloped. One 
explanation is that before Damage Directive 2014 claimants were uncertain of the outcome of 
a civil action because of the diversity among MS. The Damage Directive 2014 as the first 
legally binding legislation regulating damages claims has harmonized the system. Another 
explanation of the underdevelopment of the private enforcement of EU competition law is the 
information asymmetry or lack of evidence for the claimant in a civil case. 
As observed in previous sections, the problem with lack of evidence for the claimant in a 
damage action could be balanced out by allowing them to access leniency files. Leniency 
statements usually contain information about cartel participants, market they operated in, 
cartel duration, overcharge, effect on the economy and other materials that the claimants 
would have a hard time collecting it not allowed to access leniency statements.
168
 Therefore, 
the denied access to leniency statement constitutes a restriction on an individual’s right to 
compensation and fair trial. At the same time, the effectiveness of enforcing Article 101 
largely depends on the willingness of cartel members to cooperate. The result of granting 
leniency applicant immunity from public fines, but disclosing the evidence voluntarily given 
by the applicant could be negative and destructive for the public enforcement of EU 
competition law.  
Lack of evidence, legal uncertainty and diversity across MS deem it necessary to harmonize 
the rules regulating damage actions in EU competition law. After making the first steps with 
the Directive 2014/104/EU, the Union and competition authorities must continue to observe 
the reality and look for ways to improve the coexistence of private and public enforcement of 
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competition law.  Especially, if the EU wants to improve the private enforcement system and, 
at the same time, deny the access to leniency statements, special attention should be brought 
to issue of proving damages suffered in a civil trial. Because both enforcement systems are so 
dependent on another, it would be a mistake to neglect one in favour of the other. Seeking 
balance for now seems to be the only solution for effective dual enforcement. 
The following section will analyse whether the restriction on the right to be compensated by 
denying access to leniency is justified and proportional. 
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4. Evaluation of Denied Access to Leniency Statements under Damage 
Directive 2014 
A. Introduction 
So far the author has examined the necessity for leniency statements for effective functioning 
of both public and private enforcement of EU competition law. The Damage Directive 2014 
came into force at the end of 2016 and harmonized the rules regulating damage action for EU 
competition law violation. While the Directive presents several benefits and improvements to 
the private enforcement system of EU competition law, Article 6(6) clearly states that 
“national courts cannot at any time order a party or a third party to disclose”169 leniency 
statements. Therefore, within this section of the paper the denied access to leniency 
statements by the claimant will be analysed. First, the justification given by the EU will be 
examined. Second, the author will evaluate the provision applying the proportionality test. 
Third, alternative dispute resolution and corporate compliance programmes will be presented 
as a temporary solution for avoiding procedural problems. 
B. Justification 
Obviously problems can arise when there is more than one interest involved. When looking at 
dual enforcement of EU competition law, first, the claimant’s rights to defence must be 
considered and, second, the need for certainty of the law for the leniency applicant must be 
viewed just as important. Further, in this subchapter the clash of these fundamental rights 
within private and public enforcement of EU competition law as well as the favouring of 
leniency statement protection will be discussed in more detail.  
General assessment of the decision to deny leniency documents to claimants brings forward 
both positive and negative aspects. A positive outcome can be highlighted for the public 
enforcement and leniency applicants. Previously mentioned problem of uncertainty and 
unpredictability is resolved as now leniency applicants can be sure of what the national courts 
can and cannot order public authorities to disclose. Consequently leniency as an effective 
public enforcement tool for the Commission or NCAs is no longer at risk. Thus, at the public 
enforcement level this decision is welcomed. However, private enforcement faces a negative 
effect. The problem of information asymmetry is not resolved and claimants are left with a 
less of a chance of proving the damages suffered. The objective of the Directive 2014/104/EU 
is that it “seeks a balance between the need for a public repression of cartels and the right of 
private citizens and companies to be compensated for the damages they suffered.”170 Many 
provisions in the Damage Directive 2014 harmonize the rules of private enforcement of EU 
competition law and make it easier for private individuals to claim damages and other civil 
suits. For example, Directive 2014/104/EU harmonizes rules related to limitation periods,
171
 
joint and several liability,
172
 passing-on of overcharges and the right to full compensation
173
 
and more. Nevertheless, in this directive “some of the adopted provisions still appear to 
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prioritise the public system”174 including Article 6(6) that prohibits national courts to order 
disclosure of leniency statements. 
The attractiveness of leniency programme is that the undertaking applying for it is granted 
some level of protection and immunity. As observed in the first part of the paper private 
enforcement of cartels is largely dependent on cooperation between the Commission/NCAs 
and undertakings. By allowing third parties to access leniency files, this programme and 
cooperation are put at risk.
175
 Before Directive 2014/104/EU there was a great uncertainty 
whether or not self-incriminating statements will be available to claimants due to the above 
discussed right for a judge to grant access to leniency documents on case-by-case approach. 
Continuing with the line of thought of Prisoner’s Dilemma when explaining how cartel fall 
apart, it can also be observed that “since no reduction in any subsequent civil damages is 
granted to the immunity beneficiaries, the strengthening of the private enforcement system 
can represent a hurdle to the functioning of public enforcement, thus discouraging application 
for leniency.”176 Undertakings having to bear the risk of national actions against them might 
opt to keep silent in cases when they would have applied for leniency. Thus, it is clear that 
“the resulting uncertainty as to the disclosability of leniency-related information is likely to 
influence an undertaking’s choice whether to cooperate with the competition authorities under 
their leniency programme.”177 
The EU in the Damage Directive 2014 acknowledges that it is every person’s fundamental 
right to be compensated for loss suffered due to anti-competitive business conduct, as well as 
that information asymmetry faced by the claimants is a real problem that limits this right. 
Thus, EU states that, “as competition law litigation is characterised by an information 
asymmetry, it is appropriate to ensure that claimants are afforded the right to obtain the 
disclosure of evidence relevant to their claim.”178 However, the need to ensure certainty for 
the leniency applicants of the outcomes after they have stepped forward and to protect the 
information is, in eyes of the EU, something that even private enforcement cannot interfere 
with.
179
 The main reason for it being that leniency programmes and settlement procedures 
“contribute to the detection and efficient prosecution.”180 Furthermore, EU in the Directive 
2014/104/EU explains: 
“[A]s many decisions of competition authorities in cartel cases are based on a leniency 
application, and damages actions in cartel cases generally follow on from those 
decisions, leniency programmes are also important for the effectiveness of actions for 
damages in cartel cases. Undertakings might be deterred from cooperating with 
competition authorities under leniency programmes and settlement procedures if self-
incriminating statements such as leniency statements and settlement submissions, 
which are produced for the sole purpose of cooperating with the competition 
authorities, were to be disclosed.” 
Moreover, the EU, after protecting leniency and considering the information asymmetry, still 
tries to find a compromise. Even though Article 6(6) of the Directive 2014/104/EU denies 
access to leniency and settlement statements it does, however, list other forms of information 
available to the claimant. For example, undertakings have a right to access “documents that 
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the parties prepared specifically for competition authority proceedings […] or that the 
authority has drawn up and sent to the parties in the course of its proceedings […] as well as 
withdrawn settlement submissions can be disclosed for the purposes of civil actions after the 
authority closed the proceedings.”181 The first to suggest similar idea was Advocate General 
Ján Mazák in his opinion on case Pfleiderer in 2011. He stated that “parties adversely affected 
by a cartel may not, for the purpose of bringing civil-law claims, be given access to self-
incriminating statements voluntarily provided by leniency applicants”182 but it would also 
“run counter to the fundamental right to an effective remedy and a fair trial […] if access to 
other pre-existing documents submitted by a leniency applicant in the course of a leniency 
procedure […] were denied by the national competition authority.”183 In other words, denied 
access to leniency can be acceptable as it is a necessary and effective tool for fighting the 
cartels. But there is no reason to deny claimant the access to other materials that existed 
regardless of the public proceeding. Thus, civil action claimants under the Damage Directive 
2014 have the right to access to any pre-existing file submitted during the leniency 
programme. 
At the moment it is too soon to see the effects of the Directive on the damages claims as it has 
been in force for less than two years. The Directive is up for a review by the Commission 
until 2020 when a report will be submitted including a legislative proposal if needed.
184
 
Therefore, if found that current provision are harming or have no effect on the private 
enforcement of EU competition law the relationship with leniency and damage claims could 
change. 
To sum up, claimants accessing leniency statements, according to the EU line of reasoning, 
poses a threat to the public enforcement, especially, destabilization of cartels. Considering 
that “[t]he leniency statement would not have existed but for the cartel participant's voluntary 
act of making a leniency application, thereby facilitating the discovery and punishment of the 
cartel by the competition authority, as well as subsequent follow-on actions for damages.”185 To 
make up for the denied access to leniency, under the Damage Directive 2014 claimants have 
the right to access other materials falling out of this limitation. Naturally, a question arises 
whether the prohibition to access in leniency statements and the restriction of the claimant’s 
right to full compensation is appropriate. 
C. Proportionality Test 
Article 6(6) of the Damage Directive 2014 prohibits the national court to order public 
authorities to disclose leniency statements. The EU by denying claimant the access to 
leniency statements imposed a restriction on a person’s right to be fully compensated and to 
have a fair trial. For such a restriction to be deemed appropriate, it needs to satisfy the 
proportionality test. The methodological steps of a proportionality test include “the 
identification of a legitimate aim, the rational connection between the aim and the measure 
restricting the right, and the necessity of that measure.”186 The author will reason how each 
step is or is not justified. 
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First, the legitimate aim for restricting disclosure of evidence in a damage action is to ensure 
that the leniency statements attractiveness is not undermined. There is a greater chance that 
cartel participant will choose not to apply for leniency if that brings a negative or uncertain 
outcome. Therefore, by denying the possibility for the national court to order the competition 
authority to disclose leniency statements, the attractiveness of a leniency programme is kept 
and legitimate aim is reached. 
Second, the provision restricting the claimant’s right to access evidence is connected to the 
legitimate aim as it ensures predictability and legal certainty for the leniency applicant. If the 
case-by-case approach, where the national court must evaluate whether leniency statements 
should be disclosed, is applied leniency applicants will be faced with an uncertainty of what 
the nation court will do. Additionally, in the eyes of cartel participants, the incentive to apply 
is that they will receive full immunity and the self-incriminating statements will stay 
confidential. If claimants are granted the access to leniency statements, this benefit for the 
leniency applicant is lost. So, the connection between the provision for denying access to 
leniency statements in damage action and the legitimate aim is justified. 
Third, the necessity for the provision is also justified as, throughout the paper, it has been 
identified that without effective and attractive leniency programme in place the public 
enforcement system of EU competition law and competition itself is at risk. Formation of a 
cartel is the most serious competition law violation as the undertakings directly agree not to 
compete. Additional element characterizing cartels is the obvious strategy of the cartel 
participants is to keep the agreement secret making it difficult for the competition authority or 
the Commission to detect them. The leniency programme must be kept confidential in order 
for it to effectively fight the seriousness and secrecy of cartels. Therefore, the necessity for a 
provision that ensures that leniency statements are kept confidential is also justified. 
Finally, the proportionality test must also be applied in a narrow sense, meaning the 
restriction of a right must result in a greater amount of advantages than disadvantages.
187
 
Referring back to the justification given by the EU, damage actions are often follow-on and 
without the public proceeding many individuals who have suffered a loss due to competition 
law violation would not be able to claim the compensation. Moreover, the Damage Directive 
2014 lays out the provision that determines that nation courts can order the disclosure of pre-
existing materials and ensures that claimants are granted some amount of evidence. 
Considering these reasons and the benefits that leniency programmes and effective public 
enforcement bring to the economy and the consumer, it can be argued that by keeping 
leniency statements confidential society gains more than an individual loses by not having the 
possibility to use leniency files in a damage action. 
In conclusion, the restriction on the amount of evidence that can be disclosed during a damage 
action does propose some disadvantage and hardship on the claimant. However, in this 
subchapter author reasoned that the restriction on accessing leniency statements is justified 
and proportional as it brings great benefits and claimants are able to access all pre-existing 
evidence. 
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D. A Closer Look on Pre-Existing Materials 
After analysing the provision to deny claimant the access to leniency statements and coming 
to a conclusion that such a restriction on claimant’s rights justified and proportional, further 
research goes into examining the evidence available. Thus, in this subchapter author looks 
closer at the pre-existing materials and whether the information contain in them is enough for 
the claimants to prove damages suffered. 
The Damage Directive 2014 clearly states that it is the right of the parties to access pre-
existing materials obtained by the competition authority.
188
 In particular, Article 5 and 6 states 
that national courts can order third parties and competition authorities to disclose evidence 
upon a reasonable request from the claimant or the defendant.
189
 Pre-existing materials can be 
defined as “evidence that exists irrespective of the proceedings of a competition authority, 
whether or not such information is in the file of a competition authority.”190 The definition 
indicates that pre-existing materials can be disclosed “even if they were produced to a 
competition authority in the context of leniency or settlement discussions.”191 
Such rules certainly improve the position of the claimant and the whole system of private 
enforcement of EU competition law for two reasons. First, harmonization of rules regulating 
disclosure of evidence and all other issues increases the predictability and certainty for both 
the claimant and the defendant. Comparing to the previous practice where the evidence 
disclosed depended on the case and MS national rules, such harmonized rules improve the 
claimant’s position in the court as he/she now knows what evidence is available. Second, in 
practice injured parties “have wider access to relevant evidence” than it was the case 
previously.
192
 While the Directive in all cases denies disclosure of leniency statements and 
settlement submissions, the evidence available to the parties during litigation is greater than 
ever. 
In fact, author discovers that, according to the opinion of the Latvian NCA, the claimants are 
quite privileged in terms of accessing evidence.
193
 As discovered in an interview with a NCA, 
pre-existing materials in content do not differ much from the information contained in the 
leniency statement. For example, pre-existing materials include e-mails and economic 
calculations, while leniency statements provide a more detailed and subjective description of 
the cartel agreement.
194
 The Latvian NCA indicates that the reasons for low rates of damages 
claims and underdevelopment of EU competition law are actually different. Private 
enforcement of EU competition law is inconvenient. The court system, at least in the 
jurisdiction of the NCA interviewed, is overloaded and the priority is given to family and 
criminal law cases.
195
 Additionally, the judges in the civil courts lack specialization in 
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competition law.
196
 However, the major issue with private enforcement of EU competition 
law is the fact that damage claims are time consuming.
197
 The Latvian NCA in the interview 
mentions that in Latvia it can take 7 years to finalize the damage claim and receive the full 
compensation.
198
 
Private enforcement of EU competition law could be improved by not only the Commission 
proposing harmonization of the rules regulating the damage claims but also by MS addressing 
the issues within their civil court system. The Latvian NCA points to the necessity to educated 
the civil court judges, so that, instead of being an observer of the case, they are able to be 
more active during litigation and help the parties quantify the harm.
199
 EU competition law 
private enforcement could be further developed by making the process of litigation more 
convenient for the parties.
200
 
It can be concluded that the current rules granting parties in a damage case access the pre-
existing materials place the claimant in a favourable position. In theory, the claimant no 
longer faces uncertainty and unavailability of relevant evidence. Those are practical issues 
that are slowing down further development of private enforcement, but, if the claimant is 
willing to face certain inconveniences during litigation, full compensation can be obtained. 
Alternatively, litigation can be avoided by claiming full compensation through alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) or simply complying with the competition rules. 
E. Alternative Solution: ADR and Compliance Programme 
Thus far the focus of the paper has been on the problem with disclosure of evidence in court 
litigation and the relation to leniency statements. While the Damage Directive 2014 grants the 
claimants the right to use all pre-existing materials, the Union has also proposed for the 
claimant and the defendant to avoid litigation by encouraging the parties to settle the dispute 
using alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
201
 Additionally, the Commission has, in the recent 
years, presented corporate compliance programmes as an effective tool for preventing law 
infringements.
202
 In this subchapter author evaluates the two proposed solutions for problems 
arising from dual enforcement of EU competition law. 
Consensual dispute resolution is mentioned in the Directive as a tool for “[a]chieving a ‘once-
and-for-all’ settlement.”203 In particular, chapter VI of the Directive lays out rules on the 
suspension of limitation periods,
204
 protection of settling co-infringers against having to pay 
contribution to non-settling co-infringers
205
 and the possibility to recognize consensual 
settlement as compensation paid.
206
Advantages of ADR include speed, informality, 
flexibility, privacy, economy, finality and many others.
207
 Settling a dispute outside the court 
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is considered to be more favourable than litigation as there is a greater chance of satisfying 
both parties, especially when the parties, instead of presenting their position like in the court, 
present their interest. Interests can be satisfied in more than one way and compromise can be 
reached.
208
 
The experts from the Latvian NCA in the interview believe that ADR is a useful component 
of the legal system.
209
 ADR focuses more on compromising and strategizing than in litigation, 
in order to reach an outcome that is wanted by both parties. The claimant in a damage claim 
for competition law violation is interested in receiving compensation, while avoiding lengthy 
litigation. The Latvian NCA gives an example where the injured party can offer the 
undertaking a discount on the amount that needs to be compensated, to incentivise the 
undertaking to settle the dispute trough ADR.
 210
 The undertaking, knowing that litigation is 
inconvenient for the injured party, might decline the offer hoping the injured party will not 
raise a claim. However, the company that has violated EU competition law is interested in 
keeping such disputes quiet from the public.
 211
 An undertaking might wish to pay out the 
compensation through ADR, so that other injured parties would not join in on the damage 
claim that might be started otherwise. The rules in the Damage Directive 2014 make it easier 
for both parties to choose consensual dispute resolution and avoid the problems related to 
litigation within competition law.  
Moreover, the EU has highlighted the importance of compliance and the necessity for 
companies to be proactive in infringement prevention. Joaquín Almunia, former European 
Commissioner for Competition, illustrated the situation by saying “prevention when possible, 
repression when necessary.”212 The EU has been encouraging companies to implement 
corporate compliance programmes as a way to avoid facing public and private proceedings. A 
corporate compliance programme can be defined as a programme developed by a company to 
ensure compliance with the laws from within.
213
 They are considered to be an “essential 
element of good corporate governance.”214 
The Commission in its informative material “Compliance matters”215 has set out a list of basic 
steps that could ensure compliance. First, a company must have a clear strategy. Preferably 
the strategy is written down in a clear language and communicated to every employee and 
manager. Second, everyone in a company should sign to accept a written compliance 
agreement and be positively incentivised to follow it. Third, compliance should be regularly 
reviewed and updated. Fourth, regular monitoring for anti-competitive behaviour is needed if 
a company wants to detect infringements and prevent them. Even if compliance programme 
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fails to ensure the compliance it still can limit the exposure, respond quickly and end the 
illegal conduct. 
A successful compliance programme is certainly a helpful tool for minimizing the costs. 
Currently a fine for EU competition law infringement can be up to 10% of the company’s 
turnover at the global level, even if the anti-competitive practice has no effect.
216
 Beside the 
fine, the efforts to harmonize and improve the private enforcement could lead to more injured 
parties claiming compensation and adding to the undertaking’s expenses. Additionally, the 
investigation during the public proceedings and private law litigation can be time consuming 
and costly.
217
 Thus, an undertaking will have to face a high cost for non-compliance. 
However, not just the company’s money is at risk for non-compliance. Compliance 
programme can also help avoid ruining the company’s reputation. Considering that “[t]he 
Commission issues a press release whenever it finds an illegal behavior”218 the public image 
of a company can be harmed. Both clients and employees could feel betrayed and choose to 
go to another company. Alternatively, the opposite, if the company invests in establishing a 
compliance programme the trust and satisfaction of company’s costumer and employees could 
grow. 
Public authorities are interested in undertakings being proactive and establishing a compliance 
programme in good time for the obvious reason that it promotes competition. The Latvian 
NCA, during the interview conducted for this paper, reveals that in practice compliance 
programmes work the best for catching a single employee who decides to act anti-
competitively. In cases when boards of several companies come together to form a cartel 
agreement the compliance programme is useless.
219
 In addition, some compliance 
programmes are developed to ensure compliance while others are implemented simply as a 
formality that is not followed in practice, so that the company, in case it is caught breaching 
the law, can use an argument that the compliance programme was implemented and it is not 
the company’s fault that an employee decided not to follow it. 220 
It only benefits the Union if undertakings choose to adopt an ex ante approach to competition 
law infringements. The interviewees from Latvian NCA stress that, although public 
authorities keep neutral in company’s internal affairs, it is important for the NCA to inform 
and educate undertakings of the laws and consequences for non-compliance.
221
 In practice, it 
has been discovered that sometime an undertaking does not even know that competition law is 
being violated. Additionally, the Latvian NCA’s experience, revealed in the interview with 
the author, shows that many companies do not realize that they are responsible for their 
employees’ violation of the competition law.222 Thus, public information about the ongoing 
investigations and final decisions can encourage undertakings to start complying and 
implanting compliance programmes before they themselves have breached the law.
223
  
In summary, the Commission, while largely focusing on improving damage claims and other 
civil actions within competition law, also sees the value in parties settling their dispute 
through consensual dispute resolution as it gives the parties a possibility to reach an outcome 
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acceptable to both. Additionally, the  Commission has pointed out the importance in 
preventing non-compliance before any kind of infringement has taken place through 
compliance programmes. Such programmes can help companies avoid high costs, ruined 
reputation and help the Commission to establish a greater level of competition. 
To conclude, ADR and compliance programmes are two ways to avoid legal uncertainty in 
the courtroom either from the claim’s or the defendant’s side. The claimant can avoid the 
problems with gathering evidence for the claim. The defendant wanting to operate in an 
ethical and legal way can avoid infringement by establishing a corporate compliance 
programme. But those are only temporary solutions that can help the parties to avoid the legal 
problem arising from the dual enforcement of EU competition law. Without doubt, ADR and 
compliance programmes offer the benefits for the EU and at times the encouragement to use 
them should be the concern of the competition authority. However, the priority still must lay 
with resolving the issues related to public and private enforcement as it is the basis of the 
competition system. Not all disputes can be resolved by consensual dispute resolution and not 
all infringement can be caught and stopped by the compliance programme. 
F. Conclusion 
In the previous sections author highlighted the problem with claimants lacking evidence to 
prove the damages suffered and CJEU rulings to grant the access to leniency statement when 
deemed necessary. However, considering the importance of leniency in public enforcement of 
EU competition law the Damage Directive 2014 denied such a right to the claimants. The EU 
clearly explains why it is both private and public interest to protect leniency documents and 
tries to balance out the information asymmetry by giving claimants the right to other forms of 
evidence. However, the Directive is still under a review and it is too soon to tell the effects of 
the Directive. Furthermore, author by examining the Article 6(6) of the Damage Directive 
2018 through the proportionality test finds a similar conclusion: the restriction on the 
claimant’s right to access information is justified. Additionally, when examining the content 
of pre-existing materials, it becomes clear the information available to claimants in practice is 
useful and relevant. Another problem within civil litigation might be responsible for the 
underdevelopment of EU competition law. The Directive proposes the parties to opt for a 
consensual dispute resolution and the Commission has spoken out on the importance of 
corporate compliance programmes. 
The conclusion and the main finding of this subchapter is that private enforcement of EU 
competition law has undergone many changes and, possibly, if the Commission finds it 
necessary, the system will face more reforms in the future. The denied access to leniency 
statements for the claimant in a damage action is justified and reasonable. Nevertheless, the 
Commission still should examine how successful are damage claims across all MS that are 
based on pre-existing materials. If found that such information is not enough to prove 
damages suffered, a solution should be proposed to improve the information asymmetry. 
Considering the ongoing transformation of the private enforcement of EU competition law, 
ADR and corporate compliance programmes play an important role to the parties seeking 
stability and predictability. 
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5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to answer the following question: can the access to leniency 
statements be denied without undermining the right to full compensation under private 
enforcement of EU competition law? The attempt to find the answer included a research on 
the leniency as the an effective tool to fight cartels, the unfavourable position of the claimant 
in damage cases due to lack of evidence and the evaluation of the Damage Directive 2014 
provisions regulating disclosure of evidence and denying claimants the access to leniency 
statements.  
The results reveal that that leniency is currently the best tool available for the public 
authorities for fighting cartels and it must be kept confidential in civil lawsuits for it to be 
successful. Public enforcement is aimed at ensuring that the economy and consumers gain the 
benefits of a fair competition. Author discusses the seriousness of vertical anti-competitive 
agreements as the cartel members directly agree not to compete. The consequences include 
higher prices, less innovation, lower product diversity and an overall decrease in the economic 
efficiency, resulting in other market participants bearing a loss. Realizing the negative effects, 
illegality and high fines of cartels, undertakings operate in secrecy. The detection of such 
agreements becomes a difficult task. Fortunately, cartels face the problem of instability and 
leniency programmes take advantage of this. By offering immunity only to the first applicant, 
competition authority ensures that eventually someone will apply for leniency in order to end 
the cartel with the best possible outcome for oneself.   
While the public enforcement of EU competition law is developed and successful, private 
enforcement is lacking behind. The objective of the private enforcement system is to make 
sure that the injured party is fully compensated for the damages suffered and additionally 
discourage undertaking to breach the competition law. Reasons for the underdevelopment 
include lack of evidence, legal uncertainty and diversity across MS. Disclosure of leniency 
statements could improve the position of a claimant in a damage action. A previous CJEU 
practice established a case-by-case approach whether the national courts had to evaluate each 
situation and decide whether the access to public materials is necessary. However, the 
uncertainty for both the claimant and the applicant on what will be the outcome can lead to 
leniency programme losing its value in the eyes of potential cartel applicants. The 
Commission realised the necessity to harmonize the rules regulating damage claims and 
proposed a directive that included a provision denying claimants the access to leniency 
statements.  
Further evaluation of the said provision includes weighing the interest of public and private 
enforcement of EU competition law in a proportionality test. Author concludes that the 
restriction on the claimant’s right to access leniency statements is proportional, reasonable 
and in line with the EU reasoning in favour of the Damage Directive 2014. The benefits 
gained from the leniency programme are greater than the disadvantages faced by the claimant 
in a damage action. Moreover, realising that leniency programmes can and must be denied as 
a source of evidence leads the author to further research the pre-existing public materials that 
can be used in damage cases by the claimant. In an interview with the Latvian NCA it 
becomes clear that pre-existing materials are enough to prove the damages suffered as 
information contained in them is similar to a leniency statement and that the current 
legislation place the injured party in a favourable position in litigation. But other factors, like 
lengthy proceedings, are what discourage injured parties to raise a claim. Thus, ADR and 
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compliance programmes present valuable attribute that could temporary help the parties 
involved avoid the hardship of a court proceeding. 
Author comes to a conclusion that access to leniency statements can be denied without 
undermining the right to full compensation under private enforcement of EU competition law. 
Leniency programmes, while containing relevant information for the injured party claiming 
damages, must be kept confidential to ensure the success of it in fighting the cartels. The 
current situation, although prohibits claimants the access to these statements, still for the first 
time establish a clear and predictable distinction of the materials that are accessible i.e. pre-
existing materials. Access to all materials falling outside the leniency statements and 
settlement submissions together with other harmonized rules regulating damage claims 
improve the position of the claimant in litigation. The Damage Directive 2014 ensures 
certainty and offers a wider scope of public materials available to the claimants across all MS. 
Additionally, ADR proposes a faster and easier route to being fully compensated, but 
compliance programmes, if implemented with the purpose of ensuring actual compliance, 
could minimize the number of injured parties. Thus, the overall assessment of the disclosure 
of evidence in competition law damage actions under the current legislation leads to believe 
that claimants have access to the necessary information and can be fully compensated for the 
damages suffered. If the Commission after reviewing the Directive in 2020 concludes that still 
claimants are not fully compensated, the proposed solution still should not (and probably will 
not) include the possibility for the claimants to access leniency statements.  
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6. Annex I: Interview with the Latvian NCA 
Date of the interview: 11.05.2018 
Time of the interview: 10:00 – 10:45 
Interviewees: Antis Apsītis and Dita Dzērviniece 
Methodology: Author expands the doctrinal research by conducting an interview with the 
Latvian National Competition Authority. This institution is selected for an interview because 
Latvia as a Member State of the European Union has successfully implemented Directive 
2014/104/EU in the domestic rules and can accurately present the situation of both public and 
private enforcement of EU competition law. The Latvian NCA was represented by two 
experts: Antis Apsītis and Dita Dzērviniece. The interviewees were provided with the planned 
interview questions before hand but the author was able to ask additional questions during the 
interview. Questions focused on several issues discussed in the paper, i.e. leniency statements 
as a tool for cartel detection, underdevelopment of private enforcement of EU competition 
law, claimant’s current position in damage claims and the role of ADR and compliance 
programmes within EU competition law. The interview was conducted because the Directive 
2014/104/EU is being reviewed by the Commission until 2020 and currently there is no 
empirical data or information available on the effects of the Directive on the claimant’s 
position in proving damages suffered. The opinion and experience of the NCA helps the 
author to make reasonable conclusion and prediction of the further development of private 
enforcement of EU competition law.  
Question 1: Does the Latvian NCA leniency programme differ from the EC’s leniency 
programme? 
No. Some MS that did not have a leniency programme simply copied the one used by the 
Commission. Some MS had established their own. However, the EU currently is working on 
harmonizing all the leniency programmes, so that forum shopping is no longer possible. 
Question 2: How has the number of leniency applicants changed in Latvia since NCA 
started offering it? Is there a positive trend? 
There is a positive trend. However, in general Latvian market is so small that leniency 
applications are not many. In 2013 - 2017 in total NCA had 12 leniency applications and in 
most cases they had already started an investigation. 
Question 3: In your opinion, is there a better way to fight cartels than the leniency 
programme? 
No, nothing better has been proposed.  
Question 4: How successful is the implementation of the Directive 2014/104/EU in 
Latvia? What are the major challenges in Latvia? 
The Directive has been implemented successfully. The challenge was that Latvian civil 
procedure differs greatly from the requirements of the Directive. Thus, it took a long time to 
implement the Directive. It was necessary to explain and educate the Parliament, courts, and 
ministries. Also Latvia is lacking judges specializing in competition law. That can be 
explained by the low activity in the field of damage claims for EU competition law violation. 
Question 5: Before the Directive 2014/104/EU came into force, had the Latvian NCA 
given access to leniency programme materials to third parties? 
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No, no one has ever requested that. 
Question 6: How would you evaluate the private enforcement of competition law in 
Latvia and in Europe? Do you think that it is undeveloped? Why? 
It is underdeveloped because the private enforcement system is inconvenient. At least in 
Latvia court system in overloaded and priority is given to other issues like family law and 
criminal law. 
Question 7: What factors do you think have a bearing on a successful damages claim for 
breach of competition law in Latvia? 
Time factor is of importance. It can take 7 years before the claimant receives the 
compensation. Also quantification of the harm is a problem. In other damage cases claimant 
knows exactly how much he/she has lost. The judge simply acts an observer and makes a 
decision based on the fact presented by the parties. It is different with competition law. The 
claimant often does not know the exact amount of damages suffered and he/she tries to 
discover this during the trial. The judge in these cases should play an active role and help the 
parties in calculating the damages.  
Question 8: How realistic is it for a person to receive damages for competition law 
violation in Latvia? Do you think that in the current situation, claimants’ lack evidence 
to prove the case?  
It is realistic for the claimant to prove the case. 
Question 9: What kind of information is contained in the pre-existing materials? Does 
pre-existing materials provide enough evidence for the claimants to prove the damages 
suffered? 
Pre-existing materials include information from e-mails and economic calculations. In 
practice pre-existing materials are not too different from leniency statements. Leniency 
statements just describe the agreement in more detail and give leniency applicant’s subjective 
interpretation of what happened. 
Question 10: What factors, in your opinion, have an effect on the attractiveness of the 
leniency programme? 
The objective factors include charging higher fines. Also, informing the market participants of 
the large fines imposed could lead to a cartel member realizing the risk and costs of non-
compliance. Moreover, undertaking could choose not to apply for leniency because they have 
received funding from the EU as after the discovery of the cartel the money will have to be 
returned. The subjective factors include cartel members, for example, realising that they 
operate in a small market with not many undertakings, meaning the one who applies for 
leniency will have to face the people he/she betrayed. 
Question 11: Should third parties be allowed to access to leniency programme materials 
after the investigation has been closed in order to improve the position of the claimant in 
a civil case? 
It is not necessary to offer the claimant the access to leniency statements. The position of a 
claimant in a civil law suit is quite privileged. 
Question 12: If not, what alternative methods, in your opinion, could improve the 
claimant’s position in a civil case? 
42 
 
Educating judges in dealing with competition law damage claims could improve the 
claimant’s position in the litigation. Also involving NCAs in the court system could be 
helpful, meaning NCA decision should be binding in civil law suits. It could ease the 
claimant’s position. 
Question 13: In your opinion, how can ADR help the claimant be compensated for the 
damages suffered? 
ADR can be kept quiet from the public. Undertakings might be interested in paying out 
compensations in silence so that others injured parties would not join in on damage claim that 
would be started otherwise. Also ADR certainly takes less time than litigation, so the parties 
wanting to end the dispute might choose it. Especially, the injured party is interested in 
avoiding lengthy litigation and could offer the undertaking a discount on the amount loss if 
he/she agrees to settle the dispute through ADR. But if the litigation is really long and 
difficult, the law-breaching undertaking might decline ADR hoping that the injured party will 
not raise a claim. 
Question 14: In your experience, how effective are corporate compliance programmes in 
preventing EU competition law infringements in Latvia? 
Of course, compliance programmes could prevent EU competition law violation but not 
always. Compliance programmes work the best for catching a single employee who decides to 
act anti-competitive. In cases when boards of several companies come together to form a 
cartel agreement the compliance programme is useless. Also some compliance programmes 
are developed to ensure compliance while others are implemented simply as a formality that 
is not followed in practice. Companies, in case they are caught breaching the law, can use an 
argument that the compliance programme was implemented and it is not the company’s fault 
that an employee decided not to follow it.  
Question 15: Are they widely used by companies in Latvia/Europe? 
We are not sure. They are certainly developing. 
Question 16: How can Latvian NCA influence the decision of a company to implement 
corporate compliance programmes? 
It is important for the NCA to inform and educate undertakings of the laws and consequences 
for non-compliance. In practice, it has been discovered that sometime an undertaking does not 
even know that competition law is being violated. Also companies should realize that they are 
responsible for their employees and compliance programmes could help with regular auditing 
of the work and agreements made by managers or other employees. But decision to 
implement compliance is the company’s internal decision. NCA should keep a neutral 
attitude.  
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